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International Copyright: An
Unorthodox Analysis*
Hugh C. Hansen
ABSTRACT
Professor Hansen reviews the development of copyright from
its traditional domestic orientation to the modern emphasis on
globalization and harmonization. His commentary analogizes
modern trends in international copyright to religious equivalents. He notes that the current players include a “secular priesthood” (the traditional copyright bar and academics), “agnostics
and atheists” (newer academics and lawyers, particularly those
concerned with technology and the culture of the public domain)
and “missionaries” (whose task it is to increase copyright protection around the world and who are primarily driven by trade considerations). The copyright “crusade” has been driven by this last
group.
The author compares the task of increasing copyright protection in newly industrialized and developing countries to the conversion of any group to a new religion. The missionaries, primarily from the United States and the European Union, have the choice
of seeking voluntary or involuntary conversions. He augurs that
the prospects for voluntary conversion are slim and that coercion
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will continue to be used against newly industrialized and developing nations when copyright protection is at stake.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, copyright laws throughout the world were domestically-oriented. Copyright law is “territorial.” Each nation determines the scope of protection and rights subject only to bilateral
and multilateral agreements, which, before the Uruguay Round of
the GATT negotiations and the adoption of the agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) were essentially unenforceable.1
Overall there were two systems: (1) the Anglo-American socalled “economic” system and (2) the French and Continental “author’s rights” system with its concomitant fascination with “moral
rights.” Within each system, countries established regimes of protection that were economically and philosophically compatible
with their cultures. The broader differences and even the differences within each system were of mostly academic interest, as there
was little transnational interaction among those subject to the various laws.
This situation changed dramatically when copyright industries,
such as motion pictures, music, and computer software and hardware, began to export their products around the world massively
and successfully. The change was given additional impetus by the
growth of exports in patent industries, such as pharmaceuticals,
and the accompanying need for trademark protection
1

See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
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abroad. Intellectual property became very important to the balance
of trade and jobs. Government leaders, CEOs, and corporate
boards in the United States and abroad took notice of the importance of intellectual property laws.
Government initiatives took two forms: a push by the United
States to include protection for intellectual property in the Uruguay
Round of GATT negotiations (TRIPS),2 and initiatives in Europe
to increase patent3 and copyright protection.4 One of the purposes
of the directives was to improve European competitiveness.5
2

Id.
See, e.g., Common Position (EC) 4/94 adopted by the Council on 7 February 1994
with a view to adopting European Parliament and Council Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, 1994 O.J. (C101) 65 [[[hereinafter Biotech Directive]; Council Regulation 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 on the creation of a supplementary
protection certificate of medicinal products, 1992 O.J. (L182) 1 [hereinafter Supplementary Patent Protection Regulation].
The proposed Biotech Directive was originally published in October 1988. A
Common Position was reached in February 1994. After a second reading by Parliament
and a reconciliation proceeding, it was unexpectedly defeated at the last moment by the
European Parliament in March 1995. The process to adopt a biotech directive was started
again in December 1995, when a new proposal was adopted by the Commission and sent
to the Council. The Supplementary Protection Regulation was first proposed by the
Commission in 1990 and became effective on January 2, 1993.
4
See Council Directive 91/250 of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer
programs, 1991 O.J. (L122) 42 [hereinafter Software Directive]; Common Position (EC)
No. 20/95 adopted by the Council on 10 July 1995 with a view to adopting Directive 95/
/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal protection of databases,
1995 O.J. (C288) 14, 21. The European Parliament completed its second reading on December 14th, 1995, with nonsubstantive amendments recommended, A4-0290/95. The
Commission then passed the proposed database directive as amended on to the Council,
which adopted it on February 26, 1996. The European Parliament then gave final approval on March 11, 1996. European Parliament and Council Directive 96-9-EC of Mar. 11,
1996 [hereinafter Database Directive].
These two directives were intended to provide protection for expanded industries
and, thus, revenue for the EU countries. See infra notes 5, 13. The EU has also adopted
other copyright directives on the rental and lending right, satellite broadcasting and retransmission, and term of protection. The motivation for the adoption of these directives
had more to do with harmonization and internal market efficiency matters than with international copyright or the creation of jobs.
5
“[I]t is particularly important to ensure that appropriate legal protection is available
to computer programs and software generally, which will contribute to an environment
favourable to investment and innovation by Community firms, thus permitting the Community industry to catch up with its competitors.” Commission Green Paper on Copyright
and the Challenge of Technology–Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action, COM
(88) 172 final, at 175.
3
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The nations of the world can be divided broadly into three
groups based upon their relationship to the production and consumption of intellectual property products: (1) net sellersexporters; (2) those with the resources and industries to become net
sellers-exporters; and (3) net users-importers. The first group,
whose main member was the United States, wanted broad protection worldwide. The second group, which included some members
of the European Community, also wanted broad protection worldwide and, in addition, wanted to increase protection domestically
to give more incentives to their industries to create and compete
domestically and abroad.6 The third group, mainly developing and
newly industrialized nations, sought to limit protection at least
within their borders.
While those in groups one and two may have had disputes and
concerns among themselves,7 they were for the most part united on
the position that they wanted much greater protection in the countries in group three. Obtaining this protection would require the
conversion of those who were not true believers in the value of
copyright or other forms of intellectual property.
The EC Biotech Directive, supra note 3, was meant to establish a level of protection that would induce investment in research and development to compete with that in
the United States and Japan. See ANNA BOOY & AUDREY HORTON, SWEET & MAXWELL’S
E.C. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MATERIALS 96 (1994) (“Different levels of patent protection available in Member states could make the E.C. a less attractive place to invest in
biotechnological research when compared with the United States and Japan.”); Biotech
Directive, supra note 3, at recital 3 (“[P]rotection of biotechnological inventions will definitely be of fundamental importance for the Community’s industrial development.”).
Similarly, “the impetus [for the Supplementary Patent Protection Regulation] came from
the enactment of similar legislation in the United States and Japan, to ensure the competitive position of the E.C.’s pharmaceutical industry….” BOOY & HORTON, supra, at 147.
6
See supra notes 4, 5; infra note 13.
7
The EU Database Directive and the Duration of Term Directives have reciprocity
provisions that limit the ability of United States companies and nationals to take advantage of increased protection given to EU companies and nationals. See Database Directive, supra note 4, art. 11 (sui generis unauthorized-extraction right restricted to EU nationals, companies with habitual residence in the EU, or companies with a registered
office in a member state with a continuous link with economy of a member state, §§ 1-2;
nationals of other states may get protection when similar protection is granted in their
country, §3); Council Directive 93/98 of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 7(2), 1993 O.J. (L290) 9 (The “rule
of shorter term” provision precludes life-plus-70-year term to works of U.S. companies
and nationals.).
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This commentary attempts to address some of the problems
that the United States and others faced in bringing about that conversion. The first question was who would be on the front line of
the proselytizing efforts.
II. THE COPYRIGHT PLAYERS
The Secular Priesthood. Until approximately fifteen to twenty
years ago, copyright law was the province of a small bar and an
even smaller cadre of law professors. The numbers were small because of the complexity of the law, the limited amount of copyright
work, and the relatively few schools that taught it on a continuous
and serious basis. These lawyers and professors practiced and
wrote about copyright law in the context of traditional copyright
industries: publishing, theater, motion pictures, music, and art. The
lawyers related emotionally to the creators. No doubt many at one
time may have had aspirations to be writers or other types of creators themselves. Regardless of what the doctrine stated,8 and without necessarily articulating this view in terms of natural law, they
nonetheless believed that creators were entitled to copyright in
their works.9

8

Copyright doctrine for the most part rejects the view that authors are entitled to protection from the very fact of creation. Rather, the doctrine states that copyright laws are
designed to primarily benefit the public by providing incentives to creation. Under this
view, the benefits authors receive from the copyright laws are a means to an end and not
the end in itself. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) (“[M]onopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a
means by which an important public purpose may be achieved.”); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“[C]opyright law ... makes reward to the
owner a secondary consideration.”); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)
(“[S]ole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly
lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”).
9
In John Locke’s view of natural law, a person’s individual effort or labor created an
individual property interest. Natural law did not require balancing the laborer’s property
right against anyone else’s needs as long as there was enough raw material left for others:
The labor of his body and the work of his hands ... are properly his.
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has provided
and left it in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined to it something
that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.... For this labor being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no [person] but he can
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These lawyers and professors, who were primarily based in
New York (with the later addition of Los Angeles) formed what
amounted to a secular priesthood protecting the esoteric secrets of
idea/expression, conceptual separability, and originality.10 Copyright work was attractive because it presented the opportunity to
work in one of the most, if not the most, intellectually challenging
and interesting areas of the law.11 Copyright also provided the opportunity to work with interesting, sometimes very gifted, people
and with creative and engaging works.
International law and international trade were not of interest to
most of these lawyers or their clients. To a large extent, they have
remained outside of the international battles.
The Agnostics and Atheists. Many newcomers to copyright in
the last ten to fifteen years, especially those in academia, do not
accept the basic assumptions about creation and ownership long
shared by the copyright community. Many do not identify with
creators but rather with users: Internet (net) users, developing nations, consumers, small competitors, and creators of derivative
works. These newcomers to copyright came of age in a time when
protection was broadly applied to utilitarian works, such as computer programs, and international copyright became trade
oriented. They sensed that something was wrong with the current
system. Copyright owners were not the Oscar Hammersteins but
the Time Warners, Sonys, and MCAs. Whereas the secular priests
were and are technically challenged, this new breed not only feels

have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is
enough and as good left in common for others.
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., BobbsMerrill 1952) (1690). For analyses of John Locke’s natural-law theory in the context of
intellectual property see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533
(1993); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990).
10
Concerning this analogy, the author refers to priesthoods in ancient Greek and Roman times and not ones as found today.
11
In addition to teaching copyright law, this author has taught constitutional law, constitutional criminal law, antitrust, federal courts, EU intellectual property law, and trademark law. The author finds copyright law to be the most intellectually challenging.
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at home on the net but is creating web sites, home pages, and
teaching cyberspace law.
If this group ever had a high-protection faith in copyright, they
lost it. Today they are imbued with the culture of the public domain—a “living and vibrant” public domain. This group believes
that the public domain will protect those on the net, increase competition, allow cultural self-determination, and make multinational
corporations atone for their sins. This is an unlikely group to enlist
in the foreign copyright crusades.
The Missionaries. The copyright crusade in large part has
been driven by trade considerations. It is not surprising to find
people with backgrounds in this area (both inside and outside of
government) at the forefront of the conversion effort. Joining them
are lawyers for multinational corporations and trade associations,
some of whom were in the secular priesthood. In addition, those
entrusted with the protection of intellectual property in the European Union (EU) and in the United States government have played
key roles. The effort has attracted people with considerable skill
and ability and, to date, has been remarkably successful. Still,
much work remains to be done before it can be assured that all
souls have been saved.
III. THE RELIGION
Wholesale conversion needs the tools of religion, and fundamentalist religion at that. Certain truths are revealed and meant to
be learned, not debated. The intellectually complex points of copyright law are for seminary discussion over wine. Here, high protection is the key. The public domain is not a place where you will
find Robin Hood in Sherwood Forest righting economic
wrongs. Rather, the public domain is a place where bandits replenish supplies so they may cross the border to loot and plunder copyrighted works. For long forays into copyrighted lands, these
public domain bandits are hidden and fed by consumers who want
something for nothing and who have an apparently insatiable appetite for unprotected works.
As with all fundamentalist religions, this one has fundamental
truths. One truth is that computer programs must be protected as
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literary works.12 The words “sui generis protection” would produce gasps from the faithful. Another truth is that a high level of
protection for intellectual property would lead to more investment
and jobs.13 A third truth is that so called “national treatment” is the
way to increase protection for all and that “reciprocity” is the nationalistic work of the devil.14
The faith in national treatment, which required action as well
as belief, was harder for the righteous to adhere to fully. The United States inserted a reciprocity provision in its sui generis legisla-

12

The reasons for protecting computer programs as literary works had much to do with
the fact that this was the regime in the United States and all countries adhering to the
Berne Convention already had protection for literary works in place. This tradition of
protection worked well in the early judicial protection of computer programs. See Whelan
Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab. Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1031 (1987). But see Computer Assoc. Int’l v. Altai Inc., 928 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). A
sui generis regime, on the other hand, would require adoption of a new law by every
country in the world. This would follow endless debate on the multilateral level on what
and how much to protect. The result would be an uncertain future as to what, if anything,
would make it into the national laws, without much hope of uniformity. Even a world of
relatively low protection such as that advanced in Altai would be preferable.
13
See supra note 5. The Database Directive is also intended to provide protection for
expanded industries and, thus, revenue for the EU countries. Recently, a member of the
European Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee, Ana Palacio Vallelersundi (Spain),
stated that she hoped that “the level of protection afforded by the [directive] and its application throughout the [EU] internal market will help to strengthen investment in this key
sector and to create jobs.” Euro Parliament Approves Legislation on Copyright Protection of Databases, 10 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 43 (Feb. 1996).
The Group of Seven ministerial conference, organized by the European Commission last February, concluded that “high levels of legal
and technical protection of creative content” will be essential to ensure the “necessary climate for the investment needed for the development of the information society.”
….
The [United States] has always had strong copyright laws, allowing
producers to enjoy full control over the exploitation of films. The alliance [of European film producers] argues this has been a significant
factor in the strength of the [United States] in the global entertainment market.
Robert Rice, Gunning for the Pirates: The Film Industry Faces New Concerns over Copyright, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1996, at 11.
14
“National treatment” is a phrase which means that in country X a work originating
in a foreign country will be given the same protection as works created in country X.
“Reciprocity” means that in country X a work of foreign origin will only be given the
protection to which that work is entitled in its country of origin.

C03_HANSENARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

AN UNORTHODOX ANALYSIS

3/4/2013 4:57 PM

455

tion to protect semiconductor computer chips.15 The EU inserted
reciprocity provisions in the proposed Database Directive and the
term directive.16 Even the Berne Convention allows for reciprocity
in some circumstances.17 However, the slips and falls of our leaders do not mean that religious truths are false, only that the flesh is
weak. The TRIPS Agreement, recognizing this, requires national
treatment.18
IV. THE CONVERSION OF THE UNINITIATED
Once you have a religion and missionaries, how do you convert the uninitiated? There are two broad approaches to conversion: voluntary and involuntary.
Voluntary conversion. Voluntary conversion is obviously the
ideal. How does one achieve this? One way is by example. People see how you live your life and are impressed. They
want to have the inner glow that they see in you. This way is
somewhat problematic for the United States. If there is an inner
glow, it has not been strong enough to be seen from abroad.
The United States did not provide protection for foreign works
for over 100 years. When the United States finally did begin to
provide protection, it imposed a requirement that books be manufactured in the United States in order to protect the domestic printing industry. The United States imposed a system of formalities,
the main purpose of which seemed to be to throw works into the
public domain, including many famous foreign works. It just recently joined the Berne Convention, and did so only because other
nations told it repeatedly, “If you are going to preach the religion,
you must join the Church.”
The U.S. consumer views intellectual property as a hindrance
to immediate gratification and home-taping as something guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. United States corporations believe the
French view of moral rights is sentimental slop. The proposed leg15

Semiconductor Chip Act, 17 U.S.C.A. s 901, s 902(a) (1), s 914 (1995).
See supra note 7.
17
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
as last revised July 24, 1971, art. 7(8), 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
18
See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1199.
16
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islation in the U.S. Congress for a copyright term of life plus seventy years19 stands a chance only in the event money flows from
Europe to the United States, which is not a copyright concern but a
balance of trade concern. Thus, conversion by example is a tough
row to hoe.
A second traditional conversion argument focuses on the existence of an afterlife and one’s place in it. While the copyright
faithful might believe that the “free access” or “pro-user” people
will have some explaining to do, even they will concede that one’s
chances for salvation are not at stake.
A third argument for conversion is to show how the person
will benefit. The consuming public, however, benefits in the short
run from free access to intellectual property much as it does when
a truck is hijacked and the goods are sold below cost. Moreover,
some livelihoods in developing countries may be based upon “pirate” industries. Jobs will be lost, and it may not be apparent or
obvious how protection of intellectual property will produce new
jobs in those countries, if in fact it will. It may well be that the globalization of intellectual property is going to produce economic
winners and losers, with little hope in the short run for the losers to
change their status.
The benefit argument is that the protection of intellectual
property will produce investment in new or current industries that,
in the long run, will produce income and jobs. It has been said that
“[i]n the long run, we are all dead,”20 and it is usually short-run arguments that the “person in the street” cares about.
A fourth argument is that although in the short run it will cost
money to pay for intellectual property, this cost is as morally appropriate and necessary as paying for food, transportation, and
consumer goods. In short, it is simply wrong to take someone
else’s intellectual property. While this principle is undoubtedly
correct, there are obstacles to winning converts on these
grounds. First, the consuming public wants goods at lower prices
and shows little concern for how it gets them. If a consumer is told
that the expensive product being sold at a low price was stolen
19
20

S. 483, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995); H.R. 989, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995).
JOHN M. KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY POLICY 88 (1924).
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from a truck, the consumer’s main concern may be the validity of
the warranty.
Second, even if consumers were concerned with the morality
of theft, they generally do not treat or value intellectual property in
the same way that they do tangible property. For example, if a videotape of a movie costs forty-nine dollars, only a few dollars of
that amount represents the costs of manufacturing and delivering
the tangible property—the cassette. At least forty dollars, and
probably more, of the cost is for the intangible property—the movie. Everybody thinks it wrong to shoplift the videocassette from a
store. On the other hand, almost everybody considers it appropriate to videotape that same forty dollar movie from a television
set. Thus, it appears that the inexpensive but tangible videocassette is valued more than the expensive but intangible intellectual
property.21
If the short-run self-interest of the people is an obstacle to
conversion, the next step is converting the intellectual and power
elites who may appreciate long-run benefits. In time, the religion
can be passed on, imposed on, or trickled-down to the people. The
problem is that intellectual and power elites are used to imposing

21

It is no response to this illustration, as a speaker said at a recent conference at the
New York University School of Law, that the Supreme Court held that home-taping is
legal in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy, The Culture and Economics of Participation in an International Intellectual Property Regime (March 12, 1996) (unpublished
Roundtable discussion).
First, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision only held that “time-shifting” is a fair
use; it did not reach the issue of whether “librarying” is a fair use, which is the hometaping practice analogous to buying or shoplifting a videocassette. Moreover, there were
not five votes for holding that librarying was a fair use. See Jonathan Band & Andrew J.
McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A Peek Behind the Scenes at the Making of Sony v.
Universal, 7 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 427 (1993) (key to Justices Brennan and
O’Connor’s concurrence was lack of harm in time-shifting).
Second, consumers were home-taping long before Sony was decided in the Supreme Court and after the Ninth Circuit in Sony had held that home-taping was a violation of copyright law. Home-taping, therefore, was not the result of the Supreme Court’s
decision, however construed by the public.
Third, even if the Court had ruled that home-taping for all purposes was a fair
use, this would only have shown that a majority of the Court shared the same relative
valuation of tangible and intellectual property as the consuming public. It would reinforce the point in the text, not refute it.
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their views on others, not vice versa. An idea, whatever its merits,
may be resisted because of its origin, particularly if it originates
abroad. Autonomy, while not appropriate for the masses, becomes
a mantra for the elites.
This is true for developed as well as developing nations. There are two recent examples. The first example is in the
United States. Both the secular priests and agnostics are upset with
the changes in U.S. law mandated by TRIPS.22 Repeatedly one
hears concerns that changes in copyright law that derive from international obligations do not give due regard to the Copyright and
Patent Clause in the U.S. Constitution.23 Moreover, there is fear
that limitations on copyright set forth by the Supreme Court (for
instance, in Feist24), will not be respected.
Whatever the merits of these arguments, disregard of the Constitution or Supreme Court opinions is not a recent phenomenon. Despite the fact that Professor Melville Nimmer raised the
constitutional problems with various aspects of copyright law in
his original treatise on the 1909 Copyright Act,25 few litigants26 or
academics have sought to develop those points even after many
years. Moreover, a number of Supreme Court opinions have been
ignored or not followed by lower courts.27 Similarly, the Court it22

See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
[hereinafter URAA].
23
U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8.
24
Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
25
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT ch. 1 (1975). It appears from examining a 1975 version of the treatise that the constitutional problems in copyright law were
discussed in the treatise at least as of 1972, and may have been discussed as early as
when it was first published in 1963. Id.
26
For instance, no litigant, amicus curiae, or commentator raised, or discussed with
regard to Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), the issue
that the work-made-for-hire doctrine, which bypasses the creator and calls the employer
or hiring party the “author,” is a legal fiction that violates the “author” requirement of
U.S. CONST. art. I., §8, cl. 8. See NIMMER, supra note 25, § 6.3.
27
For example, in broadly worded opinions, the Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S.
234 (1964), seemed to preempt much of the law of unfair competition and bar protection
for three-dimensional trademarks. In Compco the Court stated:
That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made in
some other way, that the design is “nonfunctional” and not essential
to the use of either article, that the configuration of the article copied
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self has sometimes ignored, manipulated, or distorted its own precedents.28 Even the exalted Feist opinion has been given lip service by some lower courts, including one on which retired Justice
Powell was a member of the panel.29
While the recent changes in copyright law raise legitimate
concerns, the concerns are no greater than those that existed before

may have a “secondary meaning” which identifies the maker to the
trade, or that there may be “confusion” among purchasers as to which
article is which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant evidence
in applying a State’s law requiring such precautions as labeling; however, and regardless of the copier’s motives, neither these facts nor
any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting
the actual acts of copying and selling.
376 U.S. at 238. Lower courts largely ignored these two cases and, twelve years later,
the Eighth Circuit held, in effect, that both Supreme Court opinions consisted entirely of
dicta. See Truck Equip. Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1214 (8th Cir.
1976). Of course, the Supreme Court also ignored the above language and the policies
espoused in Sears and Compco when it held not only that three-dimensional trade dress
could be protected with secondary meaning but that such trade dress could be protected
without secondary meaning. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2758
(1992). While Two Pesos was decided under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a) (1994), there was no indication by the Court that state unfair competition or
trademark law, which first protected trade dress, could not continue to do so.
28
In Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954), the Court interpreted (manipulated) the
“explanation/use” holding of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879), which would
have prevented the protection for applied art, to merely state that the “protection is given
only to the expression of the idea -- not the idea itself.” In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994), the Court took the statement in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984), that if the allegedly infringing
device “were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use
would presumptively be unfair,” to stand only for the proposition that commercial use “is
a factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.” See also the discussion of Sears
and Compco and Two Pesos, supra note 27. Perhaps the Court applied a better policy in
the later cases, but it is clear that deference was not given to its earlier pronouncements.
29
U.S. Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unltd. of Durham, Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q. 2d 2049,
2050 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (Unpublished opinion not subject to citation in Fourth
Circuit) (Reference guidebook that provided information for coin-operated telephone
market including 51-page section on state tariffs infringed when defendants copied this
section verbatim). The court stated,
The evidence suggests that the Tariff Section could have been organized in many different ways and that Payphone expended a great
deal of time creating the single-page-per-view format. The Guide, according to Payphone, is the result of hundreds of hours of reviewing,
analyzing, and interpreting state tariffs and regulations.
Id.
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without much complaint. What might be particularly upsetting to
both the secular priests and the agnostics is that these changes have
been imposed from abroad, with little or no consideration of their
views. Copyright is their area, and they are territorial about
it. The message to the international set is: Mess around with tariffs, anti-dumping provisions and the like, but leave copyright to
us.
The second example is in the United Kingdom. In the United
Kingdom high protection is gospel and there are no known agnostics. Both television listings and government statutes have been
protected under copyright law,30 which the secular priests in the
United States would consider grossly overprotective and in bad
taste. But even in the land of high protection, increased-protection
changes can cause resentment if imposed from abroad. Pursuant to
the EU term directive, Kenneth Grahame’s Wind in the Willows
had come back into copyright. Alan Bennett had adapted it while it
was in the public domain and produced an annual Christmas pageant. The new U.K. law allowed derivative works created while
the work was in the public domain to remain free from new restraints. Thus Bennett would not have to seek permission from or
pay the owner of the rights to Grahame’s works, the Oxford University Library.
Oxford, however, had been looking forward to the revenue
from licensing Bennett’s production.31 One might think that, in a
high protection country, university students’ sharing with Bennett
the revenue for a derivative work for which Bennett never paid
copyright fees would be warmly received. But this is how The
Times (London) reported the facts:
Toad of Toad Hall and his friends from the riverbank have escaped the clutches of the lawmakers in
Brussels and are able to continue delighting child30

See Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act of 1988, ch. 48, § 164 (U.K.) (copyright
protection for acts of Parliament); BBC v. Time Out, 1984 F.S.R. 64 (copyright protection for television listings); Broadcasting Act of 1990, ch. 2, § 176 & sched. 17 (U.K.)
(compulsory licenses for television listings).
31
The Times (London) reported this along with the fact that the Bennett production
was not subject to copyright restraints. Emma Wilkins, Toad Escapes Clutches of Copyright Law, THE TIMES (London), Dec. 26, 1995, at 5.
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ren of all ages for the rest of the pantomime season
in London.32
Of course, children of all ages would have continued to enjoy
Toad of Toad Hall even with a licensing requirement. The slant of
the story appears to derive from the fact that the law resulted from
an EU directive. The bias against such directives appears to overshadow the potential benefit to Oxford and the under-financed
educational system of Britain.33
A final problem with any conversion effort is the fact that the
owners of the intellectual property are, for the most part, from the
United States. This seems to upset people throughout the
world. Fair-minded Europeans are comfortable with levy laws that
do not fairly compensate U.S. producers for home-copying34 and
standardization policies apparently aimed at getting U.S. technology at low cost through compulsory licensing.35 Newly industria32

Id.
See John Authers, Paying for Education: Government and Opposition Party Agree
to Postpone Highly Contentious Issue, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1996, at 8 (“acute crisis” in
U.K. university funding).
34
See, e.g., Law No. 85-660, 1985 J.O. 7495 (July 14, 1985) (Fr.) (U.S. producers and
performers excluded from claiming on the producers’ and performances’ share by application of “first fixation in France requirement” -- claims must be on works or performances first fixed in a tangible form and edited in France).
35
In 1988, at the urging of the European Commission (the Commission), the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) was created to become the pan-European
standard-setting body in the telecommunications field. In March 1993, ETSI determined
that its members should agree, as a condition of membership, to license their intellectual
property rights for all standards that ETSI approved. Such licensing would be governed
by the terms of ETSI’s Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Policy and Undertaking scheme
(the IPR Undertaking or the Undertaking). Many IP owners viewed the Undertaking as a
device to require the owners of valuable intellectual property to license at low costs and
without cross-licensing to those with less valuable intellectual property. Most of those
who would be required to license were U.S. corporations and most of those who would
have received were Europeans. ETSI had adopted the IPR Undertaking despite a formal
communication from the European Commission, which disapproved of involuntary use of
IP in standard-makings proceedings. Communication from the Commission: Intellectual
Property Rights and Standardization, COM (92) 445 final (Oct. 27, 1992).
In response to ETSI’s adoption of the Undertaking, the Computer and Business
Equipment Manufacturers Association (CBEMA) filed an antitrust complaint against
ETSI with the Commission, supported by the Business Software Alliance (BSA) and others. The Commission’s initial review found problems with the ETSI Undertaking and, on
reconsideration, ETSI scrapped the Undertaking in August 1994 and determined to develop a new IPR policy. For a full discussion of the ETSI standardization debate and the
33
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lized Asian nations that normally place a premium on being lawabiding are comfortable with their pirate industries that feed on
U.S. products. The “Ugly American” today is the one who expects
to be paid.
Involuntary Conversion. The prospects for voluntary conversion are not great. That leaves conversion by the
sword. Apparently recognizing this early on, the United States favored proceeding through GATT and TRIPS, which had mechanisms for sanctions, rather than in the WIPO, which did not.36
The WTO, or TRIPS, regime provides mechanisms for both
the United States and the European Union to enforce provisions
that increase protection in newly industrialized and developing nations.37 If these mechanisms fail, there is little doubt that bilateral
trade restraints will be used in these religious wars, whether they
be “Section 301”38 or ad hoc efforts. When the United States and
the European Union wanted to achieve increased protection in narrow areas of intellectual property between themselves, they each
used reciprocity provisions, the mortars of religious wars.39 This
should remove any doubt that coercion will continue to be used
against newly industrialized and developing nations when broad
levels of protection are at stake.

policies involved, see Alan N. Dixon, The ETSI Complaint and the European Commission’s Communication on Standardization, in 1 INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW AND POLICY ch. 39 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., forthcoming 1996).
36
This is not to say that the United States considers proceedings in WIPO to be not
worthwhile. It is actively seeking solutions for the interplay of intellectual property and
the global information infrastructure through a protocol to the Berne Convention. See
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON A POSSIBLE
PROTOCOL TO THE BERNE CONVENTION, DRAFT REPORT (1996).
37
See TRIPS, supra note 1; J. H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L
LAW. 382-88 (1995).
38
See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2242, 2411 (1994). The willingness of the United States to
use § 301 is evidenced by the recent amendments under URAA, supra note 22, § 314(c)
(1), which allow a § 301 proceeding to be brought “notwithstanding the fact that the foreign country may be in compliance with the specific obligations of the [TRIPS] Agreement.” See Reichman, supra note 37, at 384.
39
See supra note 7.
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V. CONCLUSION
Some parties might enjoy theological debates about the
nuances and complexities of copyright law and the culture of the
public domain. For developed nations, however, the trade stakes
between them and the newly industrialized and developing nations
with regard to international copyright protection are too high for
such debates to occur. That is a luxury left for academics, the refined domestic practice of the secular priests and, possibly, the developed nations in disputes among themselves.
Religious wars can be just as deadly as nonreligious
ones. Individuals of good conscience in the past have converted to
avoid the sword or economic or other sanctions. Today, the copyright wars are still being fought. The soldiers are in the field and
the developed nations have won most of the initial battles. The
question remains whether the newly industrialized and developing
nations will ever fully convert. Lip service can be a valuable defense,40 and political leaders sometimes lose the stomach for war.
Time will tell.

40
See, e.g., Seth Faison, Copyright Pirates Prosper in China Despite Promises, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1996, at 1.

